Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures
Why climate deals need stability more than perfect efficiency
Countries joining climate agreements face a fundamental choice: design deals that maximize economic efficiency, or design them to survive political upheaval and defection. A new mathematical model shows this trade-off is unavoidable—and that robustness matters far more than economists typically assume. The model identifies which climate architectures are self-sustaining, which require a founding push, and which need continuous support to survive.
Current climate proposals focus on getting the best economic outcome per ton of carbon reduced. This research shows that's backwards: a less efficient deal that members stick with will outperform a perfectly designed deal that collapses when a government changes or a country breaks its promises. The analysis maps three real proposals—carbon currencies, border adjustments, and export rebates—to show which ones can ignite on their own and which will fail without constant diplomatic maintenance.